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TERRORISM AS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS AFTER KADIC V. KARADZIC
The Alien Tort Claims Act' (ATCA) gives aliens a jurisdictional
basis for bringing tort claims in federal courts.2 The ATCA pro-
vides aliens with an independent right to bring a civil action in
federal courts when a tort has been committed but there is no
traditional nexus between the actors, the tort and the forum
state. 3 This statute was rarely utilized to bring a tort claim in fed-
eral courts,4 however, the ATCA has taken on new significance as
a mechanism for redressing international human rights
violations .'
1 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996)).
2 Id. The statute states that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." Id.
3 See id. (providing exclusive jurisdiction required for federal courts to hear claims); see
also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV.
785, 786 (1988) (explaining that state's power to exert authority over legal matters which
take place beyond its borders depends on international law's jurisdictional principles). See
generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (implicitly providing for jurisdiction over limited scope
of international offenses); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53, 60 (1981) (noting that jurisdiction is obtainable if partic-
ular acts are contrary to interests of international community); William S. Dodge, The His-
torical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L
& Comp. L. REV. 221, 234 (1996) (stating that at time Constitution was established law of
nations was believed to be part of common law, and therefore jurisdiction over violations of
law of nations could be asserted like other common law claims).
4 See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810-811 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (finding jurisdic-
tion in cases of maritime seizure of slaves for first time); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857,
862-863 (D. Md. 1961) (utilizing ATCA for second time in 182 years in finding that court
had jurisdiction to handle case which involved child custody); see also Kenneth C. Randall,
Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute,
18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 35, 49 (1985) (noting that in Bolchos, court allowed jurisdic-
tion because defendant violated treaty with France whereas in Clift, court allowed jurisdic-
tion because unlawful taking of children is tort and altering of passport is violative of law of
nations). See generally Dodge, supra note 3, at 221 (pointing out discrepancy between ma-
jority's position and that of Judge Bork's).
5 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The trend of the ATCA
being used to redress human rights violations began with this landmark case. Id. The court
ruled that deliberate torture violated universally accepted norms of human rights. Id.;
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 2, at 53. The effect of this decision was to allow other claim-
ants to bring actions in federal court seeking redress for injuries from similar human rights
violations. Id.; see, e.g., Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992). In Trajano the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the extension ofjurisdiction over a suit brought after a brutal mur-
der by the Philipine government. Id. But see Michele Brandt, Doe v. Karadzic: Redressing
Non-Site Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MiNN. L. REV.
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Despite the emergence of the ATCA as a means of compensating
victims of international human rights violations,6 there is a great
deal of uncertainty and reluctance to extend its reach to tortious
acts committed by terrorists.7 This position is supported by a dubi-
ous belief that international terrorism is not a violation of the law
of nations,' the body of law which regulates nations in relation to
one another.9
The recent decision of the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzicl°
may be used as a means of changing this position as war crimes,
in their essence, are similar in nature to terrorism and the torts
found therein." Extending the analysis of the Kadic decision,
which held that war crimes violated the law of nations, terrorism
1413, 1436 (1995). The scope of covered tort violations was not expanded to include rape
and brutality against women. Id.
6 See Trajano, 978 F.2d at 493 (allowing jurisdiction over torture and wrongful death
claim against Philippine government); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-
1542 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (applying ATCA to establish jurisdiction for alleged torture, murder
and prolonged arbitrary detention); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623
F. Supp. 246, 260-262 (D.D.C. 1985) (ruling that detention of Swedish diplomat was in
violation of law of nations).
7 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Tel-Oren is
the only case attempting to use the ATCA to acquire jurisdiction over alleged terrorists. Id.
While concurring in the result, three judges strongly disagreed over the reasons for deny-
ing jurisdiction. Id.; see also 14 CHARLEs ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE 285, 286 (1996 Supp.). There remains a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
applicability of the ATCA to terrorism. Id.; Joseph P. Dellapenna, Jurisdiction in Human
Rights Cases: Is the Tel-Oren Case a Step Backward, 79 AM. SoC'Y. INT'L L. PROC. 361, 367,
370 (1985). Several scholars have criticized the opinions as uninformed about the history
and potential application of the ATCA. Id.
8 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (stating that there was no
jurisdiction under ATCA because international terrorism was not comparable to other of-
fenses used to invoke Act); 14 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, at 286 (noting that there was
great deal of uncertainty on part of D.C. circuit court judges on whether law of nations
should include terrorism). See generally Virginia A. Melvin, Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MIN. L. REv. 211, 220 (1985)
(observing that Judge Edwards was willing to expose facts in that case to law of nations
analysis).
9 See BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 816 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining international law as "t]hose
laws governing legal relations between nations"). See generally Gordon A. Christenson,
Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 405, 414 (1997) (exam-
ining role of international law in society).
10 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
11 Id. at 242-243. The court broadened the class of activities that could be brought under
the ATCA. Id. The court relied on In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946), which recognized
that similar atrocities violated the law of war, and on the many conventions which codified
the law of war. Id.; see also Charles F. Marshall, Reframing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic
v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 597 (1996). It remains to be seen whether
the Kadic decision will open the door to new claims. Id.; Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The
Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, in 4 THE VIET-
NAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 447 (R. Falk ed., 1976). For war crimes, questions ex-
isted as to a basis for jurisdiction. Id. This lack of consensus should not preclude the prose-
cution of those guilty of violating international norms. Id.
TERRORISM
is a violation of the law of nations because of the severity of the
offense and the universal condemnation it engenders. 2
This Note asserts that if terrorism is comparable to war crimes
under law of nation's analysis, its victims should be able to assert
jurisdiction under the ATCA. Part I charts the origins and devel-
opment of the ATCA and discusses the evolving definition of the
law of nations and the defendants who violate it. Part II examines
similarities present between international acts of violence which
will trigger the use of the ATCA and the nature of acts that consti-
tute terrorism. Evidence will be presented indicating that terror-
ism is comparable to war crimes and that there is a sufficient
foundation to consider terrorism a law of nations violation. Part
III discusses the problems still faced in establishing terrorism as a
law of nations violation. It has been argued that consistent defini-
tions and consistent condemnation are needed in order to ensure
that those hurt by terrorist attacks are made whole. This Note
concludes that terrorism should be included under the jurisdic-
tional grant of the ATCA because there is ample evidence to sup-
port its status as a violation of the law of nations.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AND
ITS APPLICATION TO THE ATCA
The origins and purpose of the ATCA have long taxed the minds
of the legal community.' 3 Judge Friendly's oft cited remark that it
is a "legal Lohengrin... no one seems to know whence it came"
expresses this uncertainty.' 4 Without definitive legislative intent,
12 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (noting that "evolving standards of international law govern
who is within the [ATCA's] jurisdictional grant") (quoting Amerada Hess v. Argentine Re-
public, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987)).
13 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 223-25 (arguing that law of nations should be interpreted
not as it was at time of ATCA's passage but as evolving doctrine); Alfred P. Rubin, Professor
D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 105,
106 (1985) (reasoning that ATCA should be applied to actions involving great universals of
natural law, and not to acts that are universally condemned but not violations of natural
law); see also Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 445, 481-83 (1995) (placing of word "only" in statute has
been key to this interpretation).
14 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Judge Friendly noted that
despite the lengthy existence of the ATCA, interpreting it has led to a great deal of confu-
sion. Id.; see also Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa.
1963). The court here gives another definition of the law of nations. Id.; Randall, supra note
3, at 11. Randall suggested that the origins and purposes of the statute can be pieced to-
gether from historical and legislative sources even though no formal history exists. Id. But
see Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM.
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one must examine the language in the ATCA to determine its ap-
plication. The ATCA provides a mechanism for aliens to sue for
acts in violation of the law of nations, but the definition of this
type of tort and the identity of the tortfeasor continue to be de-
bated. The debate focuses primarily on defining violations of the
law of nations.
The concept of natural law was important in the development
of the law of nations.' 5 William Blackstone interpreted the law of
nations to cover violations of safe-conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors and piracy. 16 Traditionally, the clearest ex-
ample of a violation of the law of nations was the act of piracy
because the pirate was condemned as an enemy of all mankind.' 7
Piracy was singled out as a law of nations violation, but this did
not mean that early courts limited their interpretation of the law
of nations to specific acts; rather there was recognition of the dy-
namic nature of this concept.' 8 In determining whether a given
activity violated the law of nations, early courts evaluated the na-
J. INT'L L. 62, 62 (1988). D'Amato believes that the significance of the ATCA is better un-
derstood in light of the history of the era in which it was enacted. Id.
15 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (Welsby ed. 1854). Natural reason es-
tablished by consent of all the civilized inhabitants of the world constituted the law of na-
tions. Id.; see also United States v. La Jeune Engenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass
1822) (No. 15,551), overruled on other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). In La Jeune
Eugenie, Justice Story stated that "every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct
reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may
theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations." Id. See generally Dodge, supra note 3, at
225-26. It is certain that natural law has the strongest impact on the law of nations. Id.
16 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 68. The list was not meant to be exhaustive,
rather these were the most significant offenses of the time in which Blackstone wrote. Id.;
Dodge, supra note 3, at 226. Blackstone has been understood to believe individuals could
violate the law of nations since the three principle offenses were likely accomplished by
individuals. Id.
17 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 153, 156 (1820). The Supreme Court
found that the nature of piracy made pirates hostes humani generis, or, enemies of all man-
kind. Id. The Court recognized that all nations are united in their fight against them for
their mutual defense and safety. Id.; see also Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 229
(1844). The Court here found that piracy was a violation of the law of nations. Id.; Bolchos
v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 811 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). The court in Bolchos found that
despite acts of piracy taking place on land, the court could properly have jurisdiction in this
civil matter under the ATCA because piracy was a violation of the law of nations. Id. See
generally Randall, supra note 3, at 788. The jurisdictional principle of universality allows
for extraterritorial jurisdiction over pirates and slave traders. Id. The notion behind this
jurisdictional principle is that the seriousness of these offenses necessitates the prosecution
of such offenders in any venue. Id.
18 See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 699 (1900). The Supreme Court noted that
international law is part of the United States' law under certain circumstances and it must
be defined from the customs and usages of the nations if no treaty or statute exists. Id.; see
also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). When statutes and treaties do not offer a
guide, it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. Id.; Dodge, supra note 3, at 232.
The significance of this is that positive legislation need not be established to make crimes
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ture of the offense and the extent of its international condemna-
tion.'9 When there was general agreement among jurists and com-
mentators that an activity had received international
condemnation, the activity would be considered a violation of the
law of nations and treated accordingly.2 °
This analysis has remained valid today with only limited disa-
greement.2 1 It was argued by those attempting to limit its applica-
tion that the law of nations, as expressed in the ATCA, should be
read in light of the violations envisioned at the time of the ATCA's
22passage. This view has received minimal support, however, and
the traditional view of the concept's dynamic meaning has gainedgeneral acceptance.23
or torts a violation of the law of nation. Id. This is so because both were cognizable at
common law. Id.
19 See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 699-700. The Court went to a variety of sources
to determine how actions could violate the law of nations. Id. The Court did not merely look
to treaties but relied on the work of many legal scholars from around the world to make
their determination. Id. This approach suggests that courts would evaluate other offenses
in the same manner without being wed to a finite list of offenses. Id.; Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-
161. The law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law, or by the general usage and practice of nations, or by judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." Id.; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). This approach was applied in Filartiga when the court noted the
law of nations would be defined as it has evolved and exists in the present rather than at
the time of the Judiciary Act. Id. See generally Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort
Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply 'Historical Trivia'?, 21 J. MAR-
sHALL L. REV. 341, 345 (1988). The courts have undergone significant pains in evaluating
cases to determine if the specific acts violate the law of nations. Id.
20 See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 699. The judicial approach of relying on inter-
national scholars to define the law of nations is preferable because these important issues
should be left only to those who, by years of analysis, can give a proper framework for the
courts to apply. Id.; see also First National City Bank v. Banco National De Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 762 (1972). This opinion stated that The Paquette Habana approach demonstrated the
general rule by which courts apply rules chosen from various sources of law. Id. But see
Rubin, supra note 13, at 106. There has been strong argument that The Paquette Habana
decision should be limited to its specific factual context. Id.
21 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 815-816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring). Judge Bork, in refusing to apply law of nations analysis, asserted that the
intention of the statute was to limit the jurisdiction available under the ATCA to safe-
conducts, infringement of ambassadors' rights, piracy and others that could be shown to
violate the law of nations in 1789. Id. Since there was no violation of a treaty the court
based its decision on the single issue of whether the offense rose to the level of a violation of
the law of nations. Id. In holding that the terrorist attack on civilians did not violate the
law of nations, the court distinguished the offense from that litigated in Filartiga. Id.; Fi-
lartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. In Filartiga, the court asserted jurisdiction over a Paraguayan
police officer for acts of torture which it held to be violative of the law of nations. Id. But see
Rubin, supra note 13, at 107-08. Rubin shares the concern of the concept of universal juris-
diction. Id.
22 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798. In his concurring opinion, Judge Bork argued that ju-
risdiction can only be asserted over the three offenses which the drafters of the ATCA envi-
sioned in 1789. Id.
23 See Dodge, supra note 3, at 223 (noting cases since Judge Bork's concurrence that
have departed from this static concept); Randall, supra note 3, at 789 (analyzing expansion
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The dynamic nature of this definition does have limitations;
most notably that a violation of the law of nations must be an of-
fense with sufficient severity to make the international commu-
nity collectively condemn it.24 The concept usually is applicable to
such crimes as murder, torture or false imprisonment.25 Offenses
such as property takings or breaches of fiduciary duties are not
recognized as offenses in violation of the law of nations because
such acts do not rise to a sufficient level of international condem-
nation.26 While the eighth commandment's "thou shall not steal"
is recognized from country to country as a general prohibition, it is
not a law of nations violation because it is not severe enough to
trigger universal jurisdiction.27
of categories prosecuted under universal jurisdiction). See generally Jordan J. Paust, Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Vio-
lators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
191, 211-14 (1983) (relating law of nations to terrorism).
24 See Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that invasion
of Panama resulting in property damage from looting did not violate law of nations); Car-
michael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that imprison-
ment for failure to satisfy judgments did not violate law of nations); Khedivial Line, S.A.E.
v. Seafarer' Intl Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-53 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that alleged interference
with business does not violate law of nations); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.
Supp. 668, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding allegations of misrepresentations was insufficient
to invoke jurisdiction under ATCA); Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63
(D.D.C. 1980) (determining that libel is not law of nations violation).
25 See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844,847 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding jurisdiction exists
under ATCA for acts of torture and arbitrary imprisonment); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d
493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that wrongful death found within jurisdictional grant of
ATCA); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175-176 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that tor-
ture, arbitrary detention, and cruel treatment authorized by Guatemalan Minister of De-
fense violated law of nations); cf United Carriers v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426
(2d Cir. 1987) (exercising jurisdiction under ATCA for destruction of neutral vessel on high
seas without justification). But see Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,
916 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding death of plaintiff's wife in airplane crash did not violate law of
nations).
26 See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). The court in
Hamid refused to apply the ATCA to establish jurisdiction for allegations of fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of funds because they were not violations of the law
of nations. Id. It was asserted that finding a violation of the law of nations should be strin-
gent because the alternative could lead to nations imposing idiosyncratic rules on others
and using the law of nations as a cloak. Id.; IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d. Cir.
1975). There is great concern about nations imposing their own rules on foreign nations not
normally subject to the idiosyncrasies of international norms. Id.; see also Ramirez de Arel-
lano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1983). An offense commonly understood to
be a violation of human rights, occupation of plaintiffs land by the U.S. military, was found
not violative of the law of nations. Id.; Jafari v. Islamic Republic Of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209,
214-215 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The expropriation of property, despite constitutional protection in
the United States, is not considered a violation of the law of nations. Id.
27 See IIT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (noting that Biblical prohibition is illustrative of universal
wrong that is not violation of law of nations).
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A. The Lasting Effects of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala on the
Inclusion of Human Rights as a Violation of the Law
of Nations
The ATCA was successfully invoked twice between its enact-
ment in 1789 and 1979.28 In 1980, however, the landmark holding
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala29 brought renewed attention to this
rarely utilized statute. 30 The Second Circuit ruled that deliberate
torture at the hands of one with color of official authority, regard-
less of the nationality of the parties, violated the international law
of human rights.3 The court held that the ATCA could be used to
acquire jurisdiction if the alleged torturer is served within the
United States. 32 This decision's primary significance is in the ex-
tension of the law of nations to encompass violations of human
rights.3 3 The court looked to international agreements regarding
28 See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961) (holding that international act
of withholding custody of child violated law of nations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810,
811 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (holding that in war between two nations, unlawful seizure of
property of neutral shipowner violated international law). See generally Melvin, supra note
8, at 214-15 (giving brief analysis of two cases successfully invoking jurisdiction provided
under ATCA and explaining those courts' reasoning).
29 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
30 Id. at 880. The case marked the first time the statute was invoked to compensate
torture victims who suffered these abuses at the hands of an established government. Id.
The appellant in Filartiga was a self-described opponent of the long standing government
in Paraguay. Id. He alleged that his son was tortured and killed by Pena, who was the
Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay as a direct result of his political opposi-
tion. Id.; see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating
Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 66
(1995). The Filartiga decision has opened the door for other actions brought against tor-
tious governments. Id.; Karen E. Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala After Ten Years: Major
Breakthrough or Legal Oddity?, 20 GA. J. IN'VL & COMP. L. 543, 545 (1990). The court deter-
mined that torture was covered under the jurisdictional basis offered by the ATCA. Id.
31 See Filartiga, 630 F. Supp. at 878 (noting that torture was within jurisdictional reach
of ATCA).
32 See id. The court acknowledged the district court's hesitancy in exercising jurisdiction
because of recent cases which noted in dicta that the law of nations was to be narrowly
construed. Id. at 880; see also Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976). The
Second Circuit in Dreyfus construed the ATCA narrowly, finding that the law of nations
cannot govern a state's treatment of its own citizens. Id. But see Steinhardt, supra note 30,
at 77. Steinhardt argues that, in light of human rights treaties, the holding in Dreyfus was
an anachronism. Id.; but see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320,
325 n.16 (1981). After Filartiga, the Second Circuit limited the Dreyfus holding to commer-
cial relations. Id. It also reaffirmed its holding in Filartiga that physical torture violates
the law of nations. Id.; lIT, 519 F.2d at 1001. The court asserted the need to narrowly
construe the law of nations. Id.
33 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.) (holding that ATCA pro-
vides federal forum to hear international law disputes), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling that international human rights
violations even if not perpetrated under color of authority is still violative of law of na-
tions), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996). See generally Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3,
at 215 (analyzing effects this case will have on future international human rights law);
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conduct violative of human rights and the scholarship of the inter-
national community condemning acts of torture in coming to the
determination that torture was a violation of the law of nations. 4
The view taken recognized the dynamic nature of the concept of
the law of nations and the need to extend the law of nations to
condemn acts of torture.35 Filartiga was followed by a series of
decisions that found that the violation of human rights was indeed
a violation of the law of nations.3 6 Among these decisions were
suits against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos for his regime's prac-
tices in the Philippines,3 and also actions against agents of the
Guatemalan,"8 Argentinean3 9 and Ethiopian 40 governments.
Holt, supra note 30, at 554 (suggesting that Filartiga holding was narrowed by Tel-Oren
and other cases).
34 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-883. The court took particular note of The Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975) which notes in Article 2 that
any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an
offense to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Id. at 883; see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 (1820). The court described
piracy as a crime against the universal laws of society and pirates as the enemies of man-
kind. Id. See generally M.G. Keladharan Nayar, Human Rights: United Nations And
United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816 n.18 (1978). The Dual Conven-
tions concerning international human rights were adopted unanimously, showing the uni-
versal condemnation of acts of torture. Id.
35 See Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2 (1994) (stating
that language of Hague Convention intimates that law of nations are dynamic and evolving
"laws of humanity"); Andrew R. Sebok, International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice:
What Has Become of Our World, 24 TORT AND INS. L.J. 390, 395 (1989) (asserting that law
of nations is dynamic concept which can easily ebb and flow as time passes); Nadine Stros-
sen, Recent U.S. & International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative
Legal Process: Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 821 (1990) (noting
that Filartiga case recognized that "law of nations" is dynamic concept); Matthew I.
Kupferberg, Note, Balkan War Crimes Trials: Forum Selection, 17 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L.
REV. 375, 383 (1994) (stating that de Martens Preamble acknowledged that "concept of war
crimes is dynamic and subject to change" depending on circumstances, and "not limited to
articles of Hague Convention").
36 See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848 (holding that ATCA establishes federal forum that may
remedy violations of customary international law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1540 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (stating that international consensus condemning activities
based on universal norms justified court's exercise of jurisdiction over international tort
claim).
37 See Hileo v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that wrongful death
at hands of military intelligence under Marcos' regime constituted violation of law of
nations).
38 See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding jurisdiction
under ATCA for acts of torture, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment by Guatemalan military).
39 See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540-41 (finding that official torture, prolonged arbitrary
detention and summary execution in Argentina were actionable under law of nations
analysis).
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B. Congressional Response: A Codification of the Principle
Espoused in Filartiga
In response to Filartiga and the subsequent cases extending the
concept of the law of nations to include violations of human rights,
Congress enacted The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).41
The TVPA established a cause of action for victims of torture or
summary execution at the hands of individuals acting under color
of authority of any foreign nation.42 Since its enactment, several
victims of human rights violations have successfully acquired ju-
risdiction in the United States federal courts.43
40 See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847 (granting jurisdiction for tortious acts committed by
Ethiopian government).
41 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996)) (estab-
lishing cause of action for recovery of damages from one engaging in torture or extrajudicial
killing"). See Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11
ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 271, 283 (1994) (describing Filartiga and Tel-Oren as setting
stage for passage of Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991); David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic
v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable Rights and Obligations Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 319, 342 (1996) (stating that Congress
expanded scope of ATCA "by codifying Filartiga and extending its protection to U.S. citi-
zens under Torture Victim Protection Act"); Kathryn L. Pryor, Note, Does the Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 VA. J. IN'L
L. 969, 970 (1989) (stating that Torture Victim Protection Act was attempted response to
Tel-Oren decision and to codify Filartiga decision).
42 See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996)). The statute states:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation. . . (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for dam-
ages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
Id. § 3. In defining its terms, the statute notes that:
"Extrajudicial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized by a precious judg-
ment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does
not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out
under the authority of a foreign nation.
"Torture" means any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising
only from or inherent in, or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confes-
sion, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
Id.
43 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing
lower court ruling that TVPA claims were barred because application of statute to events
taking place prior to its enactment would have retroactive effect); Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at
848 (stating that TVPA provides federal courts jurisdiction for torts committed against
aliens in violation of law of nations); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 179 (granting jurisdiction in
federal court and private right to sue to nine Guatemalan citizens for tortious violations of
international law).
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The legislative history of the TVPA emphasized that it was nec-
essary to provide concrete enforcement measures because the
mere recognition of universal condemnation provided no comfort
to victims of torture and summary executions around the world.4 4
Congress endorsed the dynamic nature of the law of nations by
allowing suits based on other norms of customary international
law to continue being brought under the ATCA.45 It could there-
fore be argued that the passage of the TVPA gives further force to
the argument allowing for the expansion of the ATCA to new of-
fenses as they arise.
While Congress provided additional support for the use of the
ATCA through the passage of the TVPA, it also perpetuated an
existing barrier to a successful claim.46 The TVPA limited actions
to state actors or those acting under color of authority.47 By so
44 H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85. Although
torture is universally condemned, this condemnation provides scant comfort to its victims.
Id.; S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991). The thrust of the statute is enforcement and obligates
adoption of measures to "ensure that torturers are held legally accountable for their acts."
Id. By making torturers legally accountable, this legislation will ensure that "torturers and
death squads" will not "have a safe haven in the United States." Id.
45 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367 at 3, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86. Claims based on
torture or summary executions are not exhaustive of the list of actions covered under
§ 1350 of the ATCA. Id.; see also Pryor, supra note 41, at 1014. The intent of the TVPA is to
'reinforce and clarify, not supplant, the ATCA." Id. Preservation of the ATCA is for any
future "emerging international consensus of what is a violation of the law of nations." Id. at
1014-15.
46 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87. It is noted that
"the bill does not attempt to deal with torture or killing by purely private groups." Id. Some
government involvement is needed in order to establish a claim under the Torture Victim
Protection Act. Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). The Tel-Oren court makes a crucial distinction be-
tween the facts therein and the facts of Filartiga. Id. In Tel-Oren, the defendants were
members of the PLO, not a formal government entity and therefore did not act under color
of state authority. Id. The court expressed strong doubts that law of nations violations
could be committed by non-state actors. Id. See generally Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subject
of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438, 444, 445 (1947). The text deals with the interna-
tional obligations of insurgents as an example that persons and not merely states are sub-
jected to international obligations, consistent with international law. Id.
47 See Torture Victim Protection Act, § 2, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)). It is stated that liability is limited to state actors or those acting
under color of authority. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
85, 87. The legislative intent was to fashion a definition of a state actor the way it was done
for domestic tort cases for persons acting under actual or apparent authority of a govern-
ment agency. Id. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995). This provision is used when there is
an issue as to whether a state actor is involved in conduct for which a civil remedy may be
available. Id. This statute states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
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doing, Congress omitted a large group of defendants because indi-
viduals have the capacity to perpetrate human rights violations as
effectively as state actors.48 Indeed many significant human rights
violations are undertaken by individuals without formal state
sponsorship. 49 Further complicating this matter is the difficulty in
ascertaining precisely where state sponsorship exists in many
modern day conflicts.50 The TVPA therefore allows an entire class
of offenders to escape responsibility merely because of the status
of the perpetrator, in effect allowing individuals to do what a state
could not.
C. The ATCA's Exclusion of Non-State Actors Is Inconsistent
With the Principles of Universal Jurisdiction
Jurisprudence excluding individual liability in international
law is contrary to the principle of universal jurisdiction, which en-
ables a court to hear a case regardless of its origin or the national-
ity of the parties. 1 The premise of universal jurisdiction is that
Id.
48 See generally Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 473, 538 (1986). Both state and non-state
actors, including everyone from individuals to state officials, for certain offenses may have
jurisdiction acquired over them consistent with both federal and international law. Id. The
ATCA will serve as an independent jurisdictional vehicle more often in suits against non-
state actors, given the existence of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and the
Federal Tort Claims Act which regulate the permissibility ofjurisdiction over foreign states
and the United States, respectively. Id.
49 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir.) (noting that defendant in case was
responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and did not need
to be state actor by other foreign states for purposes of ATCA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996). See generally Barbara M. Yarnold, Doctrinal Basis for the International Criminal-
ization Process, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 85, 107-10 (1994) (describing international
crimes committed by individuals as containing element of international necessity and pol-
icy motivated); Kunstle, supra note 41, at 331 (analyzing decision in Kadic as it relates to
obligations of individuals under international law).
50 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45 (analyzing guidelines for defining states in determining
whether there was state involvement in action or if actors were acting in concert with
state); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987) (defining state as "an entity that has a defined territory and a perma-
nent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in formal relations with other such entities"); id. § 202 cmt.b (1987)
(explaining that "an entity that satisfies the requirements of section 201 is a state whether
or not its statehood is formally recognized by other states"). See generally Yarnold, supra
note 49, at 109-110 (categorizing international offenses as state-sponsored crimes, crimes
that are conducted with state acquiescence, crimes committed by public officials on behalf
of state, or with explicit state authorization, crimes that can only be committed by states or
have been committed by states in past, and crimes conducted by individuals acting in their
own capacity, without any state involvement).
51 See Mark Gibney, The Implementation of Human Rights as an International Concern:
The Case of Argentine General Suarez - Mason and Lessons for the World Community, 24
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165, 185 (1992) (noting universal jurisdiction can exist when inter-
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certain offenses affect not simply the victims, but all nations.52
The offenses initially covered under the law of nations suggest
that the ATCA should extend to individuals.53 It has been gener-
ally understood, however, that aliens could only bring actions
against state actors under the ATCA for a tort in violation of the
law of nations. 54 As a result, a jurisprudence has developed sug-
gesting that a non-state actor is immune from accountability for
torts under the ATCA because, it was argued, only nations could
violate international law.55 Thus, it could be argued that the scope
national law imposes liability for violations of human rights on individual rather than state
so there is no need to impose domestic standards and policies); Randall, supra note 3, at
785-86 (describing universality principle of jurisdiction as providing all states jurisdiction
when offense is recognized as universal concern); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims
Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 44-45 (1993) (explaining that universal
jurisdiction permits any state to prosecute certain offenses without regard to actor's
nationality).
52 See Alfred P. Rubin et al., History of International Law, 82 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
25, 28 (1988) (noting that individuals are bound by their duties to all mankind); see also
Lawrence J. Kahn, Pirates, Rovers and Thieves: New Problems with an Old Enemy, 20 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 293, 322-23 (1996) (noting that universal jurisdiction allows all states to police
high seas to minimize terrorism); George K Walder, The Interface of Criminal Jurisdiction
and Actions Under the United Nations Charter with Admiralty Law, 20 RUL. MAR. L.J. 217,
227 (1996) (describing that universal jurisdiction over certain offenses because they are
recognized worldwide as criminal and any nation can prescribe punishment for such ac-
tion); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathon Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 240 (1990) (recognizing that universal jurisdiction resulted largely from tracking pi-
rates through various jurisdictions). See generally Robert Kusten & Kenneth J. Harris,
Current Development, Surrender of Fugitives By the United States to the War Crimes
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 514 (1996) (describing uni-
versal jurisdiction as offenses arising from customary norms embraced by all states).
53 See United Nations Convention On The High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 15, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 2317 (defining acts of piracy as ones "for private ends by the crew or the passengers of
a private ship"); see also The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (describing act
of piracy as "aggression unauthorized by the law of nations"); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (noting that common law recognizes piracy as offense
against all nations); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 184, 196-97 (1820) (dis-
tinguishing murder and piracy by stating that former is punishable only in jurisdiction in
which it was committed while piracy is offense within jurisdiction of all nations). See gener-
ally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that law of nations does not impose "the same responsibility or liability
on non-state actors"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (not-
ing lack of consensus in international community regarding law of nations violations and
liability of non-state actors).
54 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (finding plaintiffs claims
unenforceable because terrorism by non-state actors did not violate law of nations); 14
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, at 287 (noting overall reluctance by courts to extend jurisdic-
tion to non-state actors under ATCA). But see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162, 180 (D.
Mass. 1995) (stating that statute only requires commission of "tort" which violated interna-
tional law or treaty of United States).
55 But see John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals Violate' Interna-
tional Law, 21 VAND. J. TRASNAT'L L. 47, 50-51 (1988) (arguing that individuals cannot
violate international law notwithstanding fact that pirates can be punished due to congres-
sional action); Rubin, supra note 13, at 106 (asserting that jurisdiction under ATCA was
not meant to be conferred on private parties). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling
19971 TERRORISM 577
of the ATCA has expanded to include more activities but the class
of defendants who are subject to the courts jurisdiction under it
has narrowed.
Several courts were apprehensive in extending the ATCA to
cover non-state actors, but none had been forced to decide a case
based on this issue.5" Rather, these courts resolved the cases on
other grounds.5 7 For example, in Forti v. Suarez-Mason5 8 the
court noted that because of a lack of international consensus on
torture committed by private actors, the law of nations would not
be applicable to such defendants.59 Despite this overall apprehen-
sion, until recently, this was an unsettled area of the law.6 0
D. Kadic v. Karadzic and the Necessary Expansion of the
ATCA's Law of Nation Analysis
The limitation of the ATCA's application solely to state actors or
those acting under color of authority was re-evaluated in the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion in Kadic v. Karadzic.61 The success of the
plaintiffs case appeared to depend on whether it was proven that
the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 79 (1995) (discussing stream of cases where court was un-
willing to apply ATCA to establish jurisdiction over non-state actors in violation of law of
nations).
56 See De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that nations, not individuals, are traditional subjects and concerns of international
law); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1975) (asserting that only relations
between sovereign states are within international law); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (asserting that international law only applies to states).
57 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (noting lack of consensus for
private actor responsibility under law of nations and therefore no jurisdiction); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 1980) (state sponsored torture violated law of na-
tions); Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (allegation of torture committed at hands of police).
58 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
59 Id. at 1541 (noting that law of nations only applies to states).
60 See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing
plaintiffs' claims and noting that "customary international law" does not reach private,
non-state conduct); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (stating that
"[w]hile I have little doubt that the trend in international law is toward a more expansive
allocation of rights and obligations to entities other than states, I decline to read section
1350 to cover torture by non-state actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court...").
61 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996). See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, The Alien
Tort Claims Act, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1995, at 3 (noting Kadic was first case to declare that
there was jurisdiction under ATCA where defendant was non-state actor); Hope Samborn,
Ruling Could Lead To More Human Rights Torts Cases; Court Permits Lawsuit Against
Bosnian Serb, 81 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (1995) (noting that human rights activists claimed Kadic
decision as major victory); see also Martin Flumerbaum & Brad S. Karp, War Crimes Juris-
diction, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1995, at 3 (noting decision is in accord with President's position
of allowing claims brought by foreign victims of crimes against humanity).
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defendants were state actors.62 The Kadic court was faced with
persuasive authority insisting that only state actors could commit
torts in violation of the law of nations .63 The Kadic court, however,
changed the established jurisprudence in this area, declaring that
private tortfeasors could also violate international law.64 The
court held that jurisdiction could be acquired over a non-state ac-
tor under the ATCA when there was sufficient international ac-
cord that the torts alleged were in violation of the law of nations.65
It was noted that the identity of the perpetrators of terror cam-
paigns were not relevant when these campaigns were classified as
war crimes.66
The next issue this court faced was whether the alleged conduct
violated the law of nations.6 7 The plaintiffs causes of action in-
cluded wrongful death, summary execution, rape, torture, assault
and battery.68 The court utilized the universal condemnation of
62 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45. In its analysis of what constituted a state actor, the
court found that Srpska satisfies the criteria for a state under international law. Id. Some
of the criteria cited are that the entity has a defined territory and population which was
controlled by its own government, entering into agreements with other governments, hav-
ing a president, a legislature, and its own currency. Id.; see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). In using criteria similar to that used in Kadic,
the Klinghoffer court found that the P.L.O. did not fit the definition of a state. Id. They
arrived at this conclusion because they found the P.L.O. had no defined territory, that it
was not under the control of its own government and it did not have the capacity to enter
into formal relations with other nations. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 201, 202 (1987). These sections give criteria
to determine the existence of a state and the recognition and acceptance of a state. Id.
63 See De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating that traditional subjects of international law are nations); Dreyfus v. Von Finck,
534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that international law applies to sovereign states);
I1T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that international law
applies only to states); Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(stating that torture by non-state actor was not international law violation), rev'd on other
grounds, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992).
64 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. The court held "the alleged atrocities are actionable under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were
committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes. . ." Id. But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792
(Edwards, J., concurring). The court noted that international harmony does not exist from
finding private individual liability for international law violations. Id.; Forti v. Suarez-Ma-
son, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Normally purely private torture will not
implicate the law of nations. Id.
65 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244 (holding that "alleged atrocities are actionable under the
Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed in
pursuit of genocide or war crimes").
66 See id. at 243 (declaring that when fundamental norms are violated, identity of perpe-
trators are irrelevant).
67 Id. at 238 (analyzing international law to determine if alleged offenses applied).
68 See id. at 236-237. Croat and Muslim citizens alleged that they were victims of atroci-
ties, including brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and
summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb troops as part of a campaign of genocide.
Id.
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war crimes in finding that there was a violation of the law of na-
tions and that these victims could acquire jurisdiction over the de-
fendants under the ATCA.69 Although war crimes have been inter-
nationally condemned since World War II, this was the first
instance in which courts used the ATCA as a jurisdictional basis
to allow parties to seek compensation from alleged tortfeasors for
torts committed in the commission of war crimes.70 The signifi-
cance of classifying war crimes as a violation of the law of nations
is that the court gave effect to prevailing international norms re-
garding the manner in which people may conduct themselves dur-
ing times of war.71
E. The Traditional Analysis Was Used to Determine that War
Crimes Violated the Law of Nations
The critical difference between legitimate acts of war and war
crimes is in the means undertaken to achieve political goals.72
While it is appropriate according to international norms to attack
military targets, it is inappropriate to target civilians.73 Accepta-
69 Id. at 241. The court discussed the numerous international agreements since World
War II declaring that war crimes were internationally condemned. Id. See Yamashita v.
Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 37 (1946). The Supreme Court found that war crimes violated the law of
nations, noting that military commanders should be responsible for their troops' actions.
Id. See generally Marshall, supra note 11, at 608-12. The author notes the effect of Kadic
and the substantial impact on the ATCA. Id.
70 See G.A. Res. 96(I), 1 U.N. GAOR 188-189, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946). This was a
declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations that genocide constituted a
violation of international law. Id.; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. The court held that there was a
cause of action under the ATCA, since the alleged atrocities were war crimes. Id.; see also
Marshall, supra note 11, at 608. Although not the first to allow jurisdiction in international
human rights cases, the author asserts that the Kadic court was the first to extend that
jurisdiction to include non-state actors for certain law of nations violations. Id.
71 See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 564 (1995) (discussing treatment of war crimes as violation of international
law).
72 See ELIZABETH CHADWICK, SELF-DETERMINATION, TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT 165 (1996). The author notes that in war, humani-
tarian treatment means that illicit methods of combat may not be used even if the cause
fought for is legitimate. Id.; Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War be Con-
trolled?, in JUST WAR THEORY 23 (1992). The author asserts that war crimes are illegiti-
mate even though they may have potentially legitimate causes. Id.; see also Louis Rene
Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 321, 327 (1991). The author states that there is wide condemnation to kill or severely
wound opponents in an armed conflict. Id. See generally Hague Convention (No. IV) Re-
specting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This agreement specifies standards
for war on land. Id.
73 See Major Ariane L. DeSaussure, USAF, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During
the Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 37 A.F. L. REv. 41, 64 (1994) (asserting that Iraq vio-
lated law of nations during Persian Gulf War by commingling citizens with soldiers); see
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ble means of carrying out war focus on the targeting of military
targets while the war criminal targets civilians, a practice illicit-
ing international condemnation.7 4
In an expression of international condemnation of war crimes
the international community has ratified the Geneva Convention
IV on the Protection of Victims of War,7 5 The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,76 The 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment 77 and The 1987 European Con-
vention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading
also Robert Kogod Goldman, The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of Operation Desert
Storm, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 363, 367 (1992) (noting that distinction should be made between
combatants and civilians and that civilians and civilian objects may not be targets of at-
tacks); Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical History
of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 52 (1994) (stating principles of law of war re-
quire belligerents to distinguish between military and civilian targets, permitting attacks
on military targets only). See generally Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1461
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (defendants who allegedly masterminded attack on American citizen tor-
tured and executed in Nicaragua while noncombatant citizen were not immune from tort
liability because civilians should not be targeted in times of war), rev'd, 963 F.2d 332, 336
(11th Cir. 1992).
74 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of Inter-
national Terrorism: An Introduction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 485
(A. Evans & J. Murphy eds., 1978) (noting condemnation of war crimes and in particular
targeting civilians); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (pointing out international condemna-
tion of war crimes). See generally Randall, supra note 48, at 516 (discussing proposed
amendment to ATCA noting in particular that "war crimes against civilians or prisoners of
war, which are international acts of murdering persons, mistreating persons or destroying
persons ... where such acts are not justified by military necessity" would create specific
cause of action for this offense).
75 Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Article III man-
dates the protection of civilians during time of war and notes that civilians "in all circum-
stances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, reli-
gion or faith, sex, birth or wealth or any other similar criteria." Id. See Meron, supra note
71, at 556. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has established
that the conflict there was an international one, subject to the provisions of the Geneva
Convention. Id.
76 See Convention on the Prevention And Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Annex, U.N. GAOR, Res. 260A 111 (1948) [hereinafter Convention on
Genocide]. The annex notes that genocide is a crime in violation of international law 'con-
trary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world."
Id. The agreement also provides that the identity of the perpetrator of these acts is irrele-
vant, stating that "persons committing genocide or any of the acts enumerated in Article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals." Id. art. IV.
77 See The 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N.
Doc. No. E.C.N. 4 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. This treaty calls for the
cessation of torture in all countries. Id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TOR-
TURE 7 (1973). This report argues that regimes throughout the world rely on torture as a
means of governance. Id.
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Treatment or Punishment. 78 These agreements illustrate the sen-
timent that the civilized world condemns the actions of war
criminals under any circumstance.79
Defining war crimes can often be difficult.80 Gender-based of-
fenses, including rape, were common in the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia."1 Although these offenses have never been prosecuted
78 See The 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Council of Europe Doc. H(87)4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M.
1152, 1154 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 European Convention]. To ensure against inhumane
treatment, a committee was established with the power to conduct visits. Id.; see also Su-
zanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International Law on the
Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 784 (1994). The author notes that
this treaty established a committee to visit other member states to ensure that torture was
not occurring. Id.
79 See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18,
at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7342 (1968). This agreement states that there will be no statute of limi-
tations for crimes against humanity. Id. art. I; Geneva Convention, supra note 75, art. 146.
This treaty established that any contracting party has an obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed acts prohibited under the agreement. Id.; see also CHADWICK,
supra note 72, at 187-88. The author points out that despite the different nature of their
legal systems the Allied powers after World War II were able to agree on a system to prose-
cute war criminals. Id.
80 See 1945 LONDON CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. VI. Of-
fenses considered war crimes were listed as:
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity.
Id. art. VI; see also Judith Hippler Bello & Irwin Cotler, International Decisions Canada -
War Crimes - Crimes Against Humanity - Criminal Law - Constitutional Validity - Juris-
diction - Actus Reus - Mens Rea - Defenses - Alternative Remedies - Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 464 (1996). The uncertain nature of war
crimes and crimes against humanity deprived the accused of fair notice of the consequences
of committing such inchoate and unclear international offenses. Id. The "vagueness" and
"uncertainty" of these offenses made it difficult to determine who to punish. Id.; Leila Sadat
Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles By the French Court of Cassation:
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 307 (1994). The
author explains that the court acknowledged "that crimes against humanity were different
than war crimes, the Tribunal lumped the two together for the most part, leaving behind it
a precedent whose scope and meaning were uncertain." Id.
81 See 2 HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
21 (1993). The report documented the gender-based crimes which occurred in the Former
Yugoslavia. Id.; 1 HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNA-HERZE-
GOVINA 10 (1992). The report chronicled the ethnic cleansing which was widely reported to
be occurring in the region and detailed the heinous crimes that went on. Id.; see also Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996). The plaintiffs,
as part of their complaint, claimed gender based offenses on the part of the Bosnian-Serb
troops. Id.; Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for Interna-
tional Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKE-
LEY WoMEN's L.J. 77, 86 (1994). The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has confirmed
that a major component of the systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian-
Serbs was the commission of a variety of gender based offenses including systematic rape.
Id. See generally Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1993). The Commission took particular note of the systematic
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as a war crime, The International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia has established that prosecution for rape will oc-
cur.12 Recognition of rape as a violation of the law of nations is
important because of the heinous nature of the offense and the
need to compensate those victims while expanding the law of na-
tions to suit modern international human rights violations.8 3
II. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO CLASsIFY TERRORISM AS A
VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
The law of nations is a constantly evolving doctrine. 4 The
ATCA, therefore, is not limited to a finite number of torts that
may be brought under its jurisdictional grant.8 5 Torts committed
during the commission of a terrorist act may be recognized as vio-
lations of the law of nations if there is sufficient international ac-
rape of women and children in a larger campaign of ethnic cleansing based on prejudice,
designed to commit genocide. Id.
82 See Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex 36, at 808,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). This report provided that the court had jurisdiction to prosecute
persons for "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape
and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds." Id. art. V.
83 See Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other
Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 171, 183 (1994) (asserting
that International Tribunal must develop rules and mechanisms which make explicit appli-
cation of established international law principles to violations of women's human rights,
reflect gender-specific nature of certain violations, and properly implement them to protect
both the dignity and security of women everywhere); see also Arden B. Levy, International
Prosecution of Rape in Warfare: Nondiscriminatory Recognition and Enforcement, 4 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 255, 256-57 (1994) (arguing that rape needs to be recognized by world as
crime against humanity); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human
Rights - Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 605, 648 (1996) (pointing out that rape must be classified as violation of law of nations so
that whatever context, it will receive complete condemnation).
84 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Court held that the law of
nations should be interpreted based upon what jurists and commentators believed it to be.
Id.; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-89 (2d Cir. 1980). The court stated that
courts, "must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today." Id. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork espoused the view that
there was no concept of international human rights in 1789 and therefore there could have
been no intent to include it under the jurisdictional grant of the ATCA. Id.
85 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 590. The court points out that the torturer has become like
the pirate and slave trader, an enemy of all mankind. Id.; see, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that wrongful death at hands of military personnel
under regime of Ferdinand Marcos constituted violation of law of nations); Trajano v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding plaintiff had jurisdiction under ATCA for
state sponsored murder and torture); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175-76 (D.
Mass. 1995) (stating that wrongful death within jurisdictional grant of ATCA); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding ATCA applicable for
state sponsored campaign of murder, torture and arbitrary detention).
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cord condemning it and there is a general consensus among inter-
national jurists that it is a violation of the laws of nations.8 6
Courts can look at several resources to determine whether or
not acts associated with terrorism rise to the level of offenses con-
sidered violations of the law of nations.8 7 These resources include
international agreements designed to combat and condemn terror-
ism,8 8 and the thousands of books that have been published about
terrorism and the threat it poses.8 9 The common theme of these
resources is that the means used by politically motivated ter-
rorists are illegitimate and must be combated.90 International
agreements have taken a variety of forms in an effort to combat
specific instances of terrorism.91 They often occur in response to
86 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987). States have the jurisdiction to punish offenses such as piracy, slave trade, attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide war crimes, and certain acts of terrorism as these are
offenses considered by the international community as being of universal concern. Id.; see
also Randall, supra note 48, at 526. The author notes the strong consensus in the interna-
tional community that terrorist acts are universal offenses and should be treated as such.
Id.
87 See G.A. Res. A/40/61, U.N. SCOR 579, U.N. Doc. 85-38352 (1985), U.N. Doc. 86-00872
(1986) (condemning terrorist activity with near unanimous consent). See generally Randall,
supra note 48, at 527 (discussing terming of act as violation of international law); Edward
D. Re, International Judicial Tribunals and the Courts of the Americas, 40 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1091, 1098 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of violations of law of
nations).
88 See, e.g., Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, December 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975 [hereinafter Convention, Internationally Protected Persons] (designed to combat
targeting officials for acts of violence to promote international cooperation); Montreal Con-
vention for the Suspension of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Septem-
ber 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 [hereinafter Montreal Convention] (promoting safety concerns
arising from increased terrorist attacks); Convention for the suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 [hereinafter Hijacking
Convention] (responding to increased targeting of civilian aircraft); Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), September 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 1042 [hereinafter Tokyo Con-
vention] (aiming to protect persons aboard commercial airplanes).
89 See Introduction, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES To INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1 (David
A. Charters ed., 1991) (noting that upwards of 5,000 books have been published on subject);
AMOS LAKOS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1986) (listing 5,266 published
books and articles on subject); ALEx P. SCHMID ET AL., POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE
To ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS DATA BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 1 (1988) (citing
5831 books and articles published on terrorism).
90 See WALTER LAQuuEUR, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 1 (1987) (noting that while terrorism
has received widespread worldwide attention, very little has been accomplished in terms of
understanding it); see also ALONA E. EvANs & JOHN F. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM xxiii (1978) (noting that terrorism violates vital world interests and
must be combated).
91 See, e.g., Montreal Convention, supra note 88 (promoting safety concerns arising from
increased terrorist attacks); Hijacking Convention, supra note 88 (responding to increased
attacks on civilian aircraft); Tokyo Convention, supra note 88 (protecting persons aboard
civilian aircraft).
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specific acts of terror such as air piracy and aggression against
internationally protected persons, evincing the condemnation of
such politically motivated violence against civilians. s2
The analysis by the Kadic court illustrates the need to provide a
means of compensation for victims of war crimes.93 Because of
their similar nature, it is submitted that the same means should
be extended to victims of terrorism. War crimes are similar to
acts of terrorism because of the illegitimacy of targets and types of
violations. 9 War crimes, like terrorism, can be directed at a vari-
ety of targets but the true illegitimacy of these actions is evident
when victims are civilians or their property.9 5 Historically, acts of
violence against or seizure of ambassadors are violations of the
law of nations, but atrocities against civilians have received uni-
versal condemnation only since World War H1.9
92 See Convention, Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 88 (protecting, inter
alia, diplomats to foster international cooperation); Montreal Convention, supra note 88
(promoting safety concerns arising from increased terrorist attacks); Hijacking Convention,
supra note 88 (responding to increased attacks on civilian aircraft); Tokyo Convention,
supra note 88 (protecting persons aboard civilian aircraft).
93 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing past instances when war crimes received
international attention). See Paust, supra note 11, at 446 (discussing war crimes perpe-
trated by American soldiers in Vietnam conflict); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage
Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction
Over Disputes Involving Non-Citizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (1996) (noting that private
parties have brought suits against foreign leaders for human rights abuses); Kunstle,
supra note 41, at 319 (noting that survivors of Bosnian-Serb atrocities have sought punish-
ment and compensation by filing suit in federal district court).
94 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 1 [hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism] (not-
ing that despite legitimacy of political goal, means chosen to achieve these goals make
these acts terrorism); see also CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 34-59 (1991) (discussing comparison of peace-
time terrorism to war crimes); CHADWICK, supra note 72, at 7 (asserting that acts of inter-
national violence or terrorism may be regarded as war crimes); Richard B. Bilder & Chris-
topher Blakesley, Note, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on
the Hostages Convention 1979, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 346, 347 (1996) (contending that terrorism
during peacetime is analogous to war crimes during war).
95 See Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, supra note 94, at 1 (describing
terrorist acts).
96 See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 260-62
(D.D.C. 1985) (condemning seizure of Swedish diplomat as violative of law of nations); see
also 1987 European Convention, supra note 78 (establishing committee to conduct on site
visits to ensure compliance with human rights norms); Convention Against Torture, supra
note 77 (calling for cessation of torture in all countries); Convention on Genocide, supra
note 76 (noting that all who commit this offense are subject to universal jurisdiction for
prosecution); Geneva Convention, supra note 75 (mandating human treatment of civilians
during armed conflict).
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The Kadic decision should have indirect implications on the rule
announced in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.97 In Tel-Oren,
Judge Edwards found that there was no international consensus
condemning terrorist activity as a violation of the law of nations. 98
It seems unlikely that a case such as Tel Oren would be decided
the same way given the numerous domestic initiatives in response
to new forms of terrorism" and several international agreements
condemning terrorist activities.1"' Judge Edwards failed to cap-
ture an opportunity for federal courts to respond to the ever in-
creasing problem of terrorism.10 Doubt was also expressed as to
whether non-state actors could be liable under the ATCA.1
0 2
Although it is often difficult to trace terrorist activity to specific
nations, the ruling in Kadic v. Karadzic that certain offenses re-
quire no state involvement will likely render this a moot point.1
0 3
97 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (involving survivors and representatives of persons mur-
dered in armed attack on civilian bus in Israel bringing suit against defendants for com-
pensatory and punitive damages for alleged violations of law of nations, treaties of United
States and criminal laws of United States).
98 Id. at 795 (noting split among nations as to what constitutes terrorists acts by citing
G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28 at 512, U.N. Doc. A/9102 (1973) defining terror-
ism in terms of actions relating to "colonial and alien domination").
99 See, e.g., The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Hostage Taking, 18 U.S.C.
1203 (1996) (providing criminal sanctions for detaining another person for purpose of com-
pelling government to act or abstain from acting in certain ways); The Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339b (1996) (condemning acts
of terrorism within the United States); The Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1996)
(protecting foreign officials, official guests and international protected persons); The Act for
the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States and Internation-
ally Protected Persons, 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1995) (establishing criminal sanctions for violence
at international airports).
100 See, e.g., Tokyo Convention, supra note 88 (protecting those aboard commercial air-
craft); Hijacking Convention, supra note 88 (condemning increased frequency of terrorist
attack of civilian aircraft); Convention, Internationally Protected Persons, supra note 88
(combating targeting of diplomats to engender greater international cooperation); Montreal
Convention, supra note 88 (dealing with safety concerns relating to terrorist targeting of
commercial aircraft).
101 See UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1989
(1990). The State Department believed that from 1968-1989 there were 10,914 interna-
tional terrorist incidents and the trends indicate an increase in such activity. Id.; see also
Jeffrey Sam Ross, The Nature of Contemporary International Terrorism, in DEMOCRATIC
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 17, 27 (David A. Charles ed., 1991). The author
points out that there were 125 terrorist attacks in 1968 and 855 in 1988. Id.
102 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 793-794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (find-
ing lack of international condemnation of terrorism).
103 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1996). The court found that Karadzic
could be found liable in his private capacity for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Id.; see also CHADWIcK, supra note 72, at 107. Instigators of terrorist violence
can be individuals, a group, or a government. Id.; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism and the
Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 101, at 267. Terrorists include both non-state actors and
state actors fighting for interests of the state. Id.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST COLLECTIVELY
CONDEMN TERRORISM
While the notion that terrorism should be covered under univer-
sal jurisdiction has strong support, 10 4 this position has not been
broadly accepted because of the lack of a universal definition for
terrorism.10 5 Terrorism is ultimately an all-encompassing term
used to describe acts routinely condemned under universal law
principles, yet as a whole, it is not a violation of the law of nations
because nations differ as to what constitutes legitimate use of ag-
gression.10 6 If universal jurisdiction could be established for acts
of terrorism, all states would have the power to prosecute ter-
rorists and hold the organization liable.'0 7
The need to adequately define terrorism is very important, but
often difficult.'0 8 For instance, under some existing definitions of
104 See Randall, supra note 48, at 527 (discussing terming of act as violation of interna-
tional law); Re, supra note 87, at 1098 (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of violations
of law of nations).
105 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt.a (1987) (noting some acts of terrorism are covered under universal jurisdiction);
Mickolus, Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY PERSPECTIVES 209, 210 (Y. Alexander & S. Finger eds., 1977) (discussing relevance of
statistical date collected on terrorism); Jordan J. Paust, A Definitional Focus, in TERROR-
ISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 18 (noting that definitional problems led to
problems in international condemnation); David Kris, Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2331 Under
U.S. and International Law, 27 Hav. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 590-91 (1990) (observing that re-
cent authorities are including terrorism in list of universal crimes).
106 See Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on the High
Seas, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 65, 82 (1993) (finding that political nature of terrorist acts often
allow interpretation as legitimate protest); see also Captain Bruce T. Smith, Assertion of
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction By United States Courts Over International Terrorism Cases,
1991-Oct ARMY LAw. 13, 19 (asserting that for certain offenses like aircraft piracy and hos-
tage taking, there is widely held belief that universal jurisdiction applies). See generally
Philip B. Heymann & Ian Heath Gershengorn, Pursuing Justice, Respecting the Law, 3
CRIM. L.F. 1, 15 (1991) (noting that aircraft piracy and hostage taking are universally con-
demned, regardless of causes sought to be furthered).
107 See William H. Bogar, International Cooperation in the Prevention and Suppression
of Terrorism, 80 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 386, 397-98 (1986). The author espouses using
universal jurisdiction over terrorism in an effort to ensure the likelihood of an offender's
prosecution. Id.; see also Eric S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1538 (1987).
Here an argument is made that the ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution should not
apply to crimes in which universal jurisdiction could be applied. Id. But see fleana M. Por-
ras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 146.
The danger of making terrorism a universal offense without a consistent definition is that
one nation can subject a citizen of another nation to its will under a cloak of universality.
Id.
108 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt.a (1987). It is noted that while there has been widespread condemnation of ter-
rorism, international agreements to punish these offenses were not widely adhered to be-
cause of a failure to agree on an adequate definition of the offense. Id.; James C. Duncan
USMC, Battling Aerial Terrorism and Compensating the Victims, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 241,
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terrorism, the American Revolution, the Gulf War and the United
States involvement in attempts to remove Fidel Castro from
power in Cuba could all be considered terrorist acts. 109 With this
in mind, differing views on how best to define terrorism so that the
terrorists may be brought to justice have emerged.
One school of thought espouses a single unambiguous standard
which incorporates the principles of just means and just cause in
defining terrorist activity." 0 The thrust of this argument is that
whatever form an insurgency takes, the critical elements are
whether or not the activity had sufficient justification and, if so,
whether the means to carry it out were legitimate."' It is asserted
that it would be difficult to find support in the international com-
munity for an illegitimate insurgency or even a valid one effectu-
ated through the use of violence against innocent civilian targets.
242 (1990). The problems defining terrorism stem from disagreements over what acts con-
stitute terrorism, the manner of identifying the involvement of foreign governments and
the conflict with legitimate self-determination movements. Id. See generally George Baxter,
A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 388 (1974). The author
notes that present definitions of terrorism are imprecise, ambiguous and serve no operative
legal purpose. Id.
109 See Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander,
11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter Legal Meaning of Terrorism] (noting that term
has become so comprehensive and vague to render legitimate acts of aggression terrorism);
Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifica-
tions, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240 (1995) [hereinafter Jurisprudential and Defini-
tional Clarification] (asserting that under vague definition of terrorism, United States mili-
tary action in some circumstances would be considered terrorism); see also The United
States Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994) (showing that United States anti-Castro ac-
tion in 1960's was in violation of United States law).
110 See Geneva Convention, supra note 75, art. III. This portion of the agreement im-
poses a just means requirement for non-state actors. Id.; Ad Hoc Committee on Interna-
tional Terrorism, supra note 94, at 1. Here it is noted that an insurgent group must justify
their actions under international law. Id.; Margot Kidder, Unmasking Terrorism: The Fear
of Fear Itself, in VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 14 (B. Schechterman & M. Slann eds., 3d ed.
1993). This book provides definitions of terrorism by the departments of defense, justice
and state, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.; see also DAVID A. CHAR-
TERS, DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 14-16 (1991). It is argued here
that in a definition of terrorism, it is important to explain what terrorism is not, namely
guerrilla warfare. Id.; see also Elizabeth R.P. Bowen, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Ter-
rorists Who Take Hostages: Efforts to Stop Terror- Violence Against United States Citizens, 2
AM. U. J. IN'L L. & POL'Y 153, 174 (1987). The failure on the part of the international
community to agree on one definition for terrorism is explained herein. Id.
111 See The Legal Meaning Of Terrorism, supra note 109, at 6 (asserting that "just cause"
and "just means" can distinguish permissible from impermissible insurgencies under inter-
national law); see also Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to
Terrorism, 2 TouRo J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 79 (1991) (providing model definition of terrorism
to encompass all illegitimate acts); David Turndorf, Note, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Force-
ful Response to Terrorism, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 187, 195 (1988) (arguing that United Na-
tions definition of terrorism does not take into account nature of act committed and reason
behind it).
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There are others who urge that a definition must incorporate
specific terrorist acts. 112 They argue that vague definitions of ter-
rorism perpetuate the failure to mold international law to insure
the effective administration ofjustice. 113 This approach to defining
terrorism seeks to include the condemned activities while also pro-
viding for any new forms of terrorism that may emerge. 1 14 This
approach provides a more rigid mechanism for enforcing claims
against terrorists because it removes the ambiguities inherent in
a general approach." 5 It is asserted that this method of defining
terrorism is important when comparing terrorism with war crimes
because of the specific acts the two activities share in common.
The torts of wrongful death, false imprisonment, assault and bat-
112 See Bogar, supra note 107, at 397 (arguing for broad definitional framework encom-
passing specific acts of terrorism).
113 See Duncan, supra note 108, at 244. The author explains that the problem with many
contemporary definitions of terrorism is that it fails to account for innovations terrorists
may make. Id.; Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining The Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 101, at 14. It is suggested that "a definition of ter-
rorism must take into account the constantly changing nature of tactics, targets and strate-
gies, as well as the impact of technological innovations." Id; Bogar, supra note 107, at 397.
The author believes in a broad definitional framework encompassing all acts of interna-
tional terrorism regardless of where it takes place or who perpetrates it. Id. It is argued
that only when there is this large scale commitment can terrorism effectively be combated.
Id.
114 See, e.g., The Act For The Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests and In-
ternationally Protected Persons, 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1995) (calling for punishment for those
who attack guests of U.S.); The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Hostage Taking,
18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1996) (providing punishment for hostage taking inside or outside U.S.);
The Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994) (detailing punishment for violence occur-
ring at international airports within U.S.); The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339B (1996) (condemning terrorism in United States). See
generally Duncan, supra note 108, at 244-45 (criticizing United States legislative policy for
establishing inadequate definitions for terrorism).
115 See 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1996). There, terrorism is described as:
an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or that would be a viola-
tion if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any state; and ap-
pears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnapping.
Id.; see also Duncan, supra note 108, at 244-45. The author argues that these types of
definitions do not unambiguously state what types of acts are to be considered terrorist. Id.
But see Murphy, supra note 111, at 67. Using a more general definition of terrorism will
allow more acts to fall within the definition and allow them to be punished by many differ-
ent countries. Id. See generally Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in
United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 340
(1987). International terrorists are using more sophisticated means of attack. Id. There is
an exponential increase in the terrorist threat as long as technology yields readily accessi-
ble and sophisticated weaponry. Id. A terrorist's arsenal can contain precision-guided
weapons and anti-tank rockets, weapons which have the capability of destroying a commer-
cial airliner. Id.
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tery are inherent in both war crimes and terrorism and should be
part of the definition. 116
It is asserted that in order to account for the changing nature of
terrorist activity a combination of the two approaches is needed.
The definition of terrorism, it is submitted, must include the spe-
cific activities that encompass terrorist acts and bring the commis-
sion of terrorism under the law of nations. The illegitimate means
of targeting civilians and the illegitimate causes of an insurgent
group attempting to coerce democratic governments is primary in
such a definition.
The need to adequately define terrorism for purposes of its ac-
ceptance as a tort in violation of the law of nations is essential, but
there must also be a corresponding international condemnation of
these activities." 7 The need for the international community to
combat terrorism often conflicts with the need to try to create
peace between terrorist organizations and their targets.1 " For in-
stance, the American government had a strong interest in the
agreement brokered by it between the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization, one of the world's most prolific terrorist organizations,
116 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that delib-
erate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of international law of human rights regardless of nationality of parties, and redress
is available in United States courts); see also Christopher M. Leh, Comment, Remedying
Foreign Repression Through U.S. Courts: Forti v. Suarez-Mason and the Recognition of
Torture, Summary Execution, Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Causing Disappearance
as Cognizable Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 405,
414 (1988) (asserting that citizens of other countries may bring cause of action for torts
perpetrated against them in United States); David A. Soley, Comment, Hunt v. Galtieri' A
Hypothetical Scenario for Holding International Aggressors Civilly Liable in American
Courts, 33 EMORY L.J. 211, 240 (1984) (speculating that citizens of Falkland Islands may
have tort claims against Argentina's president for his ordered invasion in 1982).
117 See R.I.K. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation on
World Peace and the Social Order, 22 TRANsP. L.J. 449, 450 (1995). Terrorist threats to civil
aviation have become a principal area of concern in the world community. Id.; see also
Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
1, 20 (1994). "Like-minded governments must create special patterns of international coop-
eration" against those countries which act as a base for terrorists. Id. See generally
Duncan, supra note 108, at 246-251. The author describes past attempts at cooperation
among nations. Id.
118 See Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International
Law Framework, 16 VT. L. REv. 461, 462-63 (1992) (arguing that international commu-
nity's failure to decide on definition creates confusion about which groups can be considered
terrorists); see also Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International
and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INTL L. 609, 643 (1992) (explaining different response to
terrorism according to type of terrorist act committed); David Aaron Schwartz, Note, Inter-
national Terrorism and Islamic Law, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 629, 629 (1991) (noting
different treatment of terrorism between Western nations and rest of world).
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and Israel for political and humanitarian reasons. 119 This cooper-
ation with the PLO gives the impression that the United States
recognizes the legitimacy of this organization's practices which
gives validity to terrorism as a means of effectuating political
change. So whereas agreements of this sort are helpful initially
through temporary cessation of hostilities, they are not conducive
to fighting terrorist activities internationally and are contrary to
the goal of compensating the victims.12 °
In addition to American policies regarding terrorists, there
must be effective and consistent responses by the international
community."12 The United States establishes economic policies
partly to exert pressure on countries to offer incentives against
terrorism.1 22 Other countries need to take similar steps by devel-
oping domestic laws which condemn terrorist practices. 23 With
international unity condemning terrorism, the momentum will be
119 See Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, supra note 109, at 246-47 (stat-
ing that U.S. recognition of Israel-PLO peace accords undermines war against terrorism);
Katherine W. Meighan, Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Preclude to a
Peace?, 34 VA. J. IN'L L. 435, 437 (1994) (stating that United States prodded Israel into
negotiations by threatening withdrawal of support); Justus R. Weiner, Book Review, The
Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: A Critical Analysis of the Cairo Agreement, 14 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 223, 225 (1995) (claiming that President Clinton used Gulf War momentum to achieve
Arab-Israeli peace accords).
120 See The Hostage Relief Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 5561 (1996). This Act defined an Amer-
ican hostage as one put in captivity while performing some form of service to the United
States and allows for some retribution. Id.; The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-39 (1996). This law provides relief to the families of terrorism
victims. Id.
121 See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (declaring that United
States policy differs depending on whether act was committed inside or outside of offender's
homeland); see also Richard Allan, Terrorism, Extradition and International Sanctions, 3
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 327, 335-37 (1993) (suggesting need for consistent response to ter-
rorism among international community); Ayaz R. Shaikh, Note, A Theoretic Approach to
Transnational Terrorism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2157 (1992) (pointing out need for interna-
tional cooperation when nations implement counter-terrorist strategies to reinforce policies
of deterrence).
122 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996) (providing system for economic sanctions against nations
supporting terrorists); 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1996) (stating that countries supporting nuclear
weapons programs will lose economic support); see also Anne Q. Connaughton, Exporting to
Special Destinations: Terrorist-Supporting Embargoed Countries, at 520, (PLI Commercial
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 733 1995) (providing all United States laws
calling for economic sanctions).
123 See Timothy F. Malloy, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Ter-
rorism: Substantive and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 Am. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PRoc. 287, 303 (1987) (pointing to failures of national responses to terrorism and blam-
ing decentralized nature of international system for subordinating international goals for
domestic ones); see also Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A
Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. IN'iL L. 25, 26 (1987)
(asserting that United Nations should prompt member nations to apply economic sanctions
to nations that support terrorist activity).
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established to make terrorism an activity comparable to war
crimes. 124 It must be understood that terrorism is at odds with
democracy and it is incongruous that countries with democratic
values and constitutional protections would tolerate the coercion
that terrorist groups seek to assert on those democratic
processes.125
CONCLUSION
When conduct is universally condemned, the perpetrators of
such conduct are subject to the principles of universal jurisdiction
which allow courts to prosecute offenders regardless of the situs of
the event or the nationality of the parties. All states should have
jurisdiction because the perpetrator is an enemy of all mankind.
International law has traditionally limited this category of of-
fenses to the most heinous of crimes in an effort to prevent nations
from subjecting their arbitrary rules on foreign nationals. The
law of nations is the doctrine encompassing these violations.
Courts look to the scope of the international community's collec-
tive condemnation and the work of jurists on the subject in mak-
ing a determination of whether an activity violates the law of na-
tions. Recent developments also indicate that private individuals
as well as states can violate the law of nations.
The law of nations has recently been expanded to include war
crimes. This inclusion is in response to international condemna-
tion of the war criminal. With war crimes, numerous international
agreements condemning war criminals existed. While war crimes
are not new, the collective condemnation of them has increased to
the extent that they are now universally condemned.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court had an opportunity in
1984 to extend universal jurisdiction to defendants accused of acts
of terrorism in Tel-Oren. Three separate opinions were filed con-
124 See Von Dardel v. Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 265 (D.D.C.
1985). The court held that the seizure and detention of a diplomat violated the law of na-
tions. Id.; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 96. The basis of international agreements
imposing liability on terrorists are torture, summary execution and the taking of diplo-
matic personnel as hostages. Id.
125 See Duncan, supra note 108, at 242. The author notes that terrorism "flies in the face
of essential human rights principles by endangering the safety, property, and freedom of
innocent individuals who have little or no connection with the grievance sought to be re-
dressed." Id.; Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, supra note 109, at 248-49.
The author notes that fighting terrorism is within the United States' "incontrovertible
norms and traditions." Id.
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curring that the law of nations should not be extended to include
terrorism. The court failed to recognize the evolving nature of the
law of nations to encompass terrorism as a violation of the law of
nations. It had evidence of universal condemnation, increasing
amounts of attacks, and victims whose lives were shattered from a
terrorist attack. Judge Edwards recognized the need for the
Supreme Court to take certiori on the issue but it was denied. As
a result, we are left with uncertainty in the federal courts as to
whether terrorism is a violation of the law of nations.
In recent years, the United States has been victim to a series of
acts of domestic terrorists. Now that terrorism has hit the United
States with much greater frequency, a decision like the one in Tel-
Oren might be decided differently. In the meantime, the interna-
tional community must work to establish a uniform definition of
terrorism to give further force to its universal condemnation of the
crimes terrorists commit.
Michael Rosetti
[Vol. 12:565
